Posted by
Buster Foghorn on Sunday, December 03, 2006 3:40:43 PM
As my thoughts turn to the job performance of Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, I realize, to borrow part of his rhetorical legacy, that before I can reach a judgment I need to consider my known unknowns. He came to the job with high expectations and a resume that was perhaps unequalled by any of his predecessors, and he is about to step down as Secretary of Defense for the second time. During the past six years Secretary Rumsfeld has worked on: transforming our military forces, implementing foreign and domestic policy changes in responses to 9/11, forcing the Taliban out of Afghanistan, toppling the government of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, democratizing and rebuilding Iraq into an ally in the global war against radical Islamists. Iraq during the pre and post-Saddam era created the greatest controversy. Since events in Iraq have been the most significant grounds of criticism, what was Secretary Rumsfeld’s role in supporting or advocating another course of action concerning Iraq with respect to just three of my known unknowns?
* What was Secretary Rumsfeld’s position and advice on the decision to seek another UN resolution on Iraq, despite the fact that there were more than a dozen violations?
Did he agree, for example, with Oriana Fallaci who argued the significant delay after 9/11 in dealing with Iraq was a mistake? She contended that world opinion supported U.S. action after 9/11, and the sooner we acted against Saddam the more world support we would have.
* Did Secretary Rumsfeld advise the President before the election in Turkey that further delays for any reason could radically alter the military campaign and battle plan?
While pursuing further UN action access to Turkey was lost as a means of transit for our forces into Iraq. U.S. forces were positioned to enter Northern Iraq and engage the opposition north of Baghdad. However, as a result of our delays and an election, the Muslim RPK party gained significant representation and opposed our use of a corridor through Turkey. We were therefore forced to conduct an invasion solely from the South, and our troops billeted in Turkey were required to board ships and travel to Iraq by another route. We never did engage the resistance in the North since our forces stopped at Baghdad. So much for waiting to make another useless trip to the UN.
* What was Secretary Rumsfeld’s position on democratizing and rebuilding Iraq, i.e., nation building, with primarily military forces?
Did Secretary Rumsfeld agree with General Powell’s maxim: if you break it you own it, or did he give other advice to the President? General Powell’s maxim suggests if we remove Saddam then we are responsible for nation building, i.e., putting Iraq’s government and infrastructure back together again. In America Alone, Mark Steyn distinguishes between how we have handled “undesirable” leaders in certain countries in the past by removing them versus the British approach in India, which was to stay for as long as it took to create a country that adhered to British law. Since there were Pentagon efforts to create an out-of-country Iraqi force under Ahmad Chalabi so as to put an Iraqi face and group in charge immediately after the fall of Saddam, the Pentagon apparently did not support a nation building strategy. Unfortunately perhaps, (our known unknown), the State Department prevailed and “the postwar plan failed to provide for the Iraqis themselves to take control as soon as possible.”