Lee Harris, in “Civilization And Its Enemies,” presents an in-depth look at our current military conflict with radical Islamic extremism. He discusses 9/11 in the context of a fantasy ideology; the nature of the enemy and the role of ruthlessness in warfare; and the critical role that forgetfulness plays in understanding why civilizations fail and the risks that we are facing.

This is a grand adventure that examines Western Civilization from the early Greeks, through the Enlightenment up to the present day. It covers a wide-ranging discussion of how military conflicts and philosophical thought from the past apply to our current situation.

The discussion also raises ideas that shine light on the endless futility of a Middle East Peace Process in any region that has not experienced “the civilizing process” societies must go through and the essential requirement of “respectability” for any nation.

Civilization And Its Enemies, is a perfect set-piece (the past, present and future) to read along with Oriana Fallaci, The Force of Reason, and Mark Steyn, America Alone.

In, The Force of Reason, Oriana Fallaci, explains how European leadership and those who shaped public opinion failed to meet the challenges of assimilating their Middle Eastern immigrants. She discusses her shock and disbelief at the role of the “elites” in trading away basic western values. Her journey especially covers the recent past.

In, America Alone, Mark Steyn, explains why the future of Europe is hard-wired into an Islamic presence that is based upon demographics and the declining birth rates in most European countries (except for the high birth rates of Islamic immigrants). His view is one of the future and how the countries of Europe have failed to maintain a necessary population base to preserve their basic values and identity.

Civilization And Its Defense offers perspective and presents our conflict against an extremist Islamic ideology with a broader brush that helps the reader to put our current situation in historical context and understand why we face what President Bush refers to as the defining challenge of the 21^st Century.

As the Biden-Hagel Resolution waits for a floor vote and the Warner allies discuss a more acceptable, but equally damaging Resolution, nattering Senators wail about conditions in Iraq. Many urge “redeployment” (an offensive term that is a deceptive use of the English language amounting to a call for retreat and failure) without any acknowledgement about what conditions in Iraq or the Middle East will look like after the U.S. departs the region. The race for the exits preempts all rational discussion, few impress with their knowledge of the region or battlefield, and even fewer ask relevant questions about the enemy.

In a recent report, we learn that the plan is underway in Baghdad and success is resulting in a response from some that “it is too quiet.” Progress is being made and yet only the provocative news reports of the latest bombing seem to evoke a response from our elected officials.

Meanwhile, I am waiting for any critic of the President’s Plan who is promoting a withdrawal from Iraq, to ask and answer a question that Sherlock Holmes might tell Watson is like noticing that the dog didn’t bark. The question is:

· What is the condition of the enemy?

Apparently, Al Qaeda is undertaking its own withdrawal in Baghdad. Isn’t it interesting what a demonstration of determination and will can accomplish? For example, few have probably considered this report:

In other words, battling the insurgency now essentially means battling Al Qaeda. This is a major accomplishment.

Last October, my sources began telling me about rumblings among the insurgent strategists suggesting that their murderous endeavor was about to run out of steam. This sense of fatigue began registering among mid-level insurgent commanders in late December, and it has devolved to the rank and file since then. The insurgents have begun to feel that the tide has turned against them.

In many ways, the timing of this turnaround was inadvertent, coming at the height of political and bureaucratic mismanagement in Washington and Baghdad. A number of factors contributed to this turnaround, but most important was sustained, stay-the-course counterinsurgency pressure. At the end of the day, more insurgents were ending up dead or behind bars, which generated among them a sense of despair and a feeling that the insurgency was a dead end.

The Washington-initiated "surge" will speed-up the ongoing process of defeating the insurgency. But one should not consider the surge responsible for the turnaround. The lesson to be learned is to keep killing the killers until they realize their fate.

Additionally, an informed proponent of any withdrawal option should also ask and answer these questions:

· How is Al Qaeda doing (i.e., what is the condition of their supplies, morale, and manpower)?

Partial Answer: What needs to be understood is the central role that Al Qaeda — or more accurately its successor organization, a group called the Islamic State of Iraq — is playing on these fronts and the diminishing role of all the other insurgent groups.

· If we adopt the Murtha/Kerry/Edwards plan to retreat and capitulate are we handing over victory to Al Qaeda?

For those who are ready to jump on the “let’s micromanage the President’s War Plan” bandwagon, it is time to think about G. K. Chesterton’s advice: “He who weds the spirit of the times quickly becomes a widower.”

Chesterton was quite right; joining an emotional bandwagon is not leadership. For example, all of those who opposed Gulf War I looked quite foolish a few months later.

There is only one Commander in Chief; it is time for Congress to join ranks and stop contemplating actions that will give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Dear Senator,

The Resolution today by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee disapproving the President's Iraq policy is very harmful to the national interest. Contrary to Senator Biden's disclaimer, the public dispute can only be interpreted as an effort to embarrass the President. Furthermore, there is no evidence the resolution will improve our position by making our troops safer or our mission easier.

There is a need during hazardous times, when we face a ruthless enemy, for elected officials to communicate privately to the Commander in Chief and withhold announcing their public opinions when they disagree. Further, any comments of disapproval should include a plan for success that is arguably superior to the President's plan. During wartime, elected officials need a modicum of self-restraint. They have to filter their comments of public disagreement with an understanding of the risks.

Yesterday, General Petraeus testified that such a Resolution would give encouragement to the enemy and depress morale among our allies and troops. Certainly, General Petraeus was correct. We know this enemy and 9/11 was a response to our ealier signs of weakness.  The President’s plan is underway and a non-binding resolution only gives encouragement to the enemy. Contrary to Senator Chuck Hagel’s argument, there is nothing courageous about voting on a nonbinding resolution which advises the enemy that if they just bide their time we will run for cover.

A non-binding measure is not an act of political courage; please don’t embarrass Washington residents by publicly voting for failure. All of those who opposed Gulf War I looked quite foolish a few months later. G.K. Chesterton said: “He who weds the spirit of the times quickly becomes a widower.” Chesterton was quite right; joining an emotional bandwagon is not leadership. A show of unity and a wait and see approach are called for at this time to give the plan a chance for success.

In the movie, The Godfather, Don Vito Corleone, the head of the family, told a rival family that he opposed entering the drug and prostitution business with them. Immediately, a member of the family spoke out against the Godfather and publicly showed there was a lack of unity. The rival Mafia gang recognized they could get their way if they removed the Godfather and subsequently tried to kill him. Disunity communicates weakness and a lack of will.

There is only one Commander in Chief, please don’t break ranks and give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Dear Senator:

I am writing to express my concern about early comments about denying funds by Democrats to the President's speech before it is given. Statements by Speaker Pelosi and others that threaten to eliminate support for any additional funding before hearing the reasons for an increase of troops and the rationale for such a proposal not only consign the President to the status quo but seem purely partisan, political, and signal signs of capitulation and abandonment without exploring all options. Surely more thought, effort, and planning can go into a response to the President's proposal, which he spent two months investigating, than a premature refusal to accept any new way forward?

If anyone wanted a strategy to discourage officials in Iraq from taking responsibility, cutting funding would be an ideal remedy. If anyone wanted to sabotage any chance of success in the region, cutting funding would guarantee less than a full effort to achieve success. If anyone wanted to catapult the region into chaos and achieve a terrifying scenario, cutting funding would be a great idea.

Before any response is taken, discretion suggests that one listen to the President's plan and evaluate it in a clear-headed manner. As for withdrawing from the region under an umbrella of "redeployment," such euphemisms for retreat are offensive. Plain speaking is called for on a matter of such importance. Despite the current preoccupation with minimum wage as the sine qua non of all political problems, Iraq, Iran, and the Middle East demand far greater attention.

As for cutting funding and leaving the region, please consider this excerpt from an article in the current issue of The Weekly Standard, by Reuel Marc Gerecht, a Middle East analysts, about what might transpire in the region if we fail or pull out: The Consequences of Failure in Iraq, They would be awful. But failure can still be averted. 

Certainly the most damning consequence of failure in Iraq is the likelihood that an American withdrawal would provoke a take-no-prisoners civil war between the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, which could easily reach genocidal intensity. The historical parallel to have in mind is the battle between subcontinent Hindus and Muslims that came with the independence of India. Although of differing faiths, the pre-1947 Hindus and Muslims were often indistinguishable culturally, linguistically, and physically. Yet they "ethnically cleansed" their respective new nations, India and Pakistan, with exuberance. Somewhere between 500,000 and one million Muslims and Hindus perished, tens of thousands of women were raped, and more than ten million people were forced to flee their homes. This level of barbarism, scaled down to Iraq's population, could quickly happen in Mesopotamia, long before American forces could withdraw from the country. (And it's worth recalling that few British officials anticipated the communal ferocity that came with the end of the Raj.)

Mr. Gerecht is one of the few to actually describe the consequences of a €redeployment€ and detail the conditions in Iraq if we pull out or otherwise fail. Does America really want to abandon 5% to 10% of the population to slaughter? Such an estimate based on a population of 25 million in Iraq means that one million to two and half million people could be killed. Additionally, there seems to be little consideration for what the U.S. costs would be in terms of military casualties were we to withdraw and then be forced to enter Iraq again when terrorists set up shop and start attacking American targets around the world. The consequences of failure seem totally unacceptable as concluded by the Baker-Hamilton Commission.

If the President adopts the proposal by Frederick Kagan and General Jack Keane (U.S. Army, ret.) calling for a substantial and sustained surge of U.S. troops to secure and protect critical areas of Baghdad, I would at least like to get a sense that elected officials have reviewed and studied the proposal before talking. As of this date, many public comments display a shocking failure by the speaker to even be familiar with the slide show that is available on the internet.

Whatever your personal feelings about Iraq, attacks by the leadership on the President's plan will give succor to the enemy, they will demoralize our Iraqi allies, and they will cost U.S. lives by making the troops job more difficult. All I ask is that before joining any bandwagon or effort by Senator Reid, Speaker Pelosi, and Congressman Murtha, that you seriously consider the consequences of your vote and comments.

Thank you for your time.

Today, with smiles from ear to ear, trumpets blaring, much fanfare, and cameras rolling, Democratic members of Congress appeared for the television audience to announce -- wage slavery will continue! Dependency on government is back.

Okay, they didn't say that, but essentially by increasing minimum wage they made it easier for anyone in the targeted class who was truly in need of a salary increase to continue in the same job. While there are disagreements about what constitutes wage slavery, for our purposes, wage slavery might apply to a minimum-wage worker who has no choice in who they work for, the type of job they can get, or due to circumstances under their control (e.g., lack of education) limit their employment options to jobs paying only minimum wage.

For a moment, consider welfare reform which was hailed as a significant accomplishment by President Clinton. Congress recognized welfare destroyed individual motivation and trapped the poor in an endless cycle of government dependency. The tragedy of welfare was evident in the anecdotal reports of third and fourth generation family members still depending on the government. Welfare reform was designed to stop that cycle of dependency and force people into the work place.

Now, consider the effect of an increase in minimum wage for those truly needing a push up the ladder, like the welfare recipient, and motivation to enhance their market value to employers. With this mandated federal subsidy will they be more or less likely to get their high school diploma, attend school in the evenings to gain another skill, or attend a vocational school? Or will they find it more comfortable to depend on the federal increase in wages and continue in their low paying minimum wage job? Wage slavery is another form of dependency. If you were a truly needy beneficiary of a federally mandated minimum wage increase, for example, a head of household and sole-wage earner, who has been trapped in a minimum wage job for more than a year, it is now easier for you to stay a wage slave in your current job.

So, who is Congress trying to help with an increase in minimum wage? George Will recently looked at those affected by an increase in minimum wage and found a small group which would be even smaller if those receiving minimum wage, but not truly needy were excluded. Therefore, this increase in minimum wage arguably isn't for the part-time worker who lives in a household where annual income is $42,000 per year or greater. Nor is the increase for the restaurant worker who receives significant tips or the teenager working part-time while in school. Additionally, it isn't for the two-thirds of those earning the federal minimum today that will, a year from now, have been promoted and be earning 10 percent more. Furthermore, it isn't for the seventy percent of the work force in 29 states covered under state mandated minimum wage that is higher than the Federal Minimum Wage. Finally, it isn't for the 2 percent of high school students in states that allow people to leave school before 18 who will drop out due to the wage increase.

While the foregoing members of the group receive minimum wage, surely they are not members of the targeted group requiring federal intervention? They are not the truly needy. Their status is temporary, and in many cases their household is not in need of federal help. It is hard to believe they constitute the significant crisis that requires expedited House action (in disregard of campaign promises about protecting minority rights), reductions in entry level jobs for first time workers (e.g., the young high-school student working at the corner gas station today who used to fill up the gas tank, wash the car windows, and put air in the tires), and an increase in prices for everyone in the market place to compensate businesses for the greater costs of doing business.

So for the very few left who qualify as truly needy it is time to thank the Democrats who after twelve years in the wilderness as the minority have made a federally mandated subsidy their number one priority. If you are one of those truly needy workers, you will find it easier to stay in that minimum wage job and wait for the next federal hand-out. Don't bother getting off the couch, turning off the cable movie, and moving up the ladder. Dependency is back and being a wage slave will soon be easier.

The Soul of Battle by Victor Davis Hanson examines more than just the wartime accomplishments of three military leaders from democratic societies. Professor Hanson explains why three Generals - Epaminondas, William T. Sherman, and George S. Patton differ from other great military figures, (such as Caesar and Alexander), that lead wars to conquer, acquire territory, and enslave: Generals who lead democratic soldiers and who achieve greatness in battle reach a level not found in others. This spiritual dimension he calls the soul of battle.

What then is the soul of battle? A rare thing indeed that arises only when free men march unabashedly toward the heartland of their enemy in hopes of saving the doomed, when their vast armies are aimed at salvation and liberation, not conquest and enslavement. Only then does battle take on a spiritual dimension, one that defines a culture, teaches it what civic militarism is and how it is properly used.

PART III - The Third Army, Patton’s Race into Germany

This review is limited to Part III, which presents a portrait of Patton the “simple soldier.” Patton the military figure is brought to life as a unique officer for his times and a warrior who seemingly prepared his entire life to defeat the Nazis in World War II. We learn how Patton was able to create a level of morale unique among the allied forces even though the Third Army was a makeshift force cobbled together as a diversionary tactic. We gain an appreciation for Patton’s insights into warfare and why his favorite expression and guiding principle about audacity saved lives and could have saved tens of thousands more, but for the failures of Eisenhower and Bradley. We discover how the challenges facing Patton differed from those encountered by Epaminondas and Sherman and why to some extent Patton’s accomplishments rival or exceed these earlier figures.

Many today think of Patton as reckless and not politically correct, but these pages provide a profile showing Patton as eminently prepared and confident. Professor Hanson writes: “Critics forget that behind the foul mouth, sometimes offensive and near-lunatic pronouncements, and showy dress, Patton was without question the best educated, most experienced, and most widely read general in the American Army.” We learn that Patton was dyslexic and an average student at West Point, but unlike many of his contemporaries, such as David Eisenhower and Omar Bradley who were more bureaucratic and bothered with his zeal, Patton was intellectually curious and combined a lifelong habit of reading with his studies of military history, warfare, and leadership. He represented America in the 1912 Olympics and placed fifth in the pentathlon, served in World War I, was a talented horseman and Calvary officer, and joined General Pershing to travel into Mexico to catch Pancho Villa. Patton befriended the King of Sweden, took fencing lessons during a two-year period in France from the master of arms of the French Calvary School, and through a disciplined regimen of study he read about the great battles including those of ancient and modern Europe. He was the best-prepared and most knowledgeable American tank commander, and he read Field Marshall Rommel’s book on tank warfare. He made time to walk the battlefields of Europe and absorbed the lessons from those battles and the role of geography in warfare in a way than none of the other senior Allied officers fighting in Europe had done. The Germans feared him more than any other allied officer. While Eisenhower and Bradley sounded compassionate and caring, they were more concerned about the sensibilities of the British and Russians, appearances, and public comments. Their concerns cost a tragic number of lives. It was Patton’s audacity and ruthlessness in battle that could have ended the war in Europe in the fall of 1944 when Patton saw an opening to march through the heartland of Germany, take Berlin, and then march on to Czechoslovakia to stop the Russians from taking Eastern Europe.

Professor Hanson follows Patton in his march through Europe and examines each of the numerous occasions when allied commanders (Eisenhower and Bradley) refused to take Patton’s advice, placed roadblocks in his way, were unable to see the tragic consequences of a flawed battle plan or delay, and prevented him from racing forward. In each case tens of thousands died in German death camps, the German army, and the allied forces, as the war dragged on longer than necessary.

While each General is covered in a separate part, in Part III focusing on Patton there are comparisons to Epaminondas (his battle against Sparta) and Sherman (the Civil War) – how their challenges differed; the size of their Armies and the particular problems they faced with re-supply, terrain, the enemy, and their own chain of command; and how the changing nature of warfare created new obstacles or advantages for each.

In one chapter, for example, we learn how slavery differed in early Greece, from America during the Civil War, and Germany during World War II. Professor Hanson explains how Germany was unique in its efforts to murder entire categories of Jews, Poles, Slavs, and gypsies. In addition to the efficient delivery of death to the Jews, Professor Hanson explains how in the two earlier cases the Greeks and the South looked on their slaves as property and maintained them as valuable assets. This rationale was entirely absent for Germany and more died from slave labor than the number of Jews murdered in the concentration camps.

For anyone who has recently seen the George C. Scott performance of Patton, scenes from the movie come alive on these pages as Patton races recklessly to the front to lead his men into battle. Furthermore, the past speaks to us about the pressing issues facing us today in Iraq, the Middle East, our military leadership, our news media coverage of the war, and how we conduct warfare.

 

What are we to think of the announcement by Keith Ellison, the newly elected Congressman from Minnesota, and the comments for and against his announcement, that he will use the Koran to take the oath of office as the first elected Muslim Congressman in January 2007?

* Dennis Prager in an article entitled: “America, Not Keith Ellison, decides what book a congressman takes his oath on” argued that the Bible has been our traditional book; “when all elected officials take their oath of office with their hands on the very same book, they all affirm that some unifying value system underlies American civilization;” and if it is good enough for Jews, Mormons, and atheists, then Ellison should use the same book.

* Eugene Volokh, in “Oh Say, Can You Swear on a Koran?” responded that officials have selected sacred books other than the Bible. He observed further that under the Federal Rules of Evidence a witness could affirm or take no oath. The purpose of the oath is that it be meaningful to the witness and impress upon him the seriousness of the occasion. Professor Volokh explains the oath is to awaken the conscience of the witness and impress on him a duty to testify truthfully.

* Today, Mr. Prager explained in response to criticism of his position, he was not arguing for a religious test, but for Mr. Ellison to recognize the role of the Bible and the traditions that have provided the freedoms all Americans enjoy.

Additionally, are there other factors that were not considered which suggest that the use of the Koran might be different? What if:

• Islam is both a religion and a political ideology,
• Many Muslims reject man-made laws of their country of residence: for example, in England only 1 in 4 Muslims believe England is their country, “twenty-eight percent hope for the U.K. one day to become a fundamentalist Islamic state,” and some believe that only Sharia law applies to them,
• An oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States is inconsistent with the Koran’s teaching that all belongs to Allah and Allah’s laws as found in the Koran must be obeyed, and
• An oath on the Koran inherently conflicts between the belief system in the sacred text and the words of the oath to protect and defend the laws of the United States.

Shouldn’t Congressman Ellison at least address these issues with his constituents before beginning his service in Congress?   Shouldn’t Congressman Ellison reconcile his obligation under the Koran and his duty to protect and defend the laws of the United States before taking an oath on a sacred text that many believe forbids man-made law, separation of church and state, and equal treatment of all religions?

As my thoughts turn to the job performance of Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary, I realize, to borrow part of his rhetorical legacy, that before I can reach a judgment I need to consider my known unknowns. He came to the job with high expectations and a resume that was perhaps unequalled by any of his predecessors, and he is about to step down as Secretary of Defense for the second time. During the past six years Secretary Rumsfeld has worked on: transforming our military forces, implementing foreign and domestic policy changes in responses to 9/11, forcing the Taliban out of Afghanistan, toppling the government of Saddam Hussein from Iraq, democratizing and rebuilding Iraq into an ally in the global war against radical Islamists. Iraq during the pre and post-Saddam era created the greatest controversy. Since events in Iraq have been the most significant grounds of criticism, what was Secretary Rumsfeld’s role in supporting or advocating another course of action concerning Iraq with respect to just three of my known unknowns?

* What was Secretary Rumsfeld’s position and advice on the decision to seek another UN resolution on Iraq, despite the fact that there were more than a dozen violations?

Did he agree, for example, with Oriana Fallaci who argued the significant delay after 9/11 in dealing with Iraq was a mistake? She contended that world opinion supported U.S. action after 9/11, and the sooner we acted against Saddam the more world support we would have.

* Did Secretary Rumsfeld advise the President before the election in Turkey that further delays for any reason could radically alter the military campaign and battle plan?

While pursuing further UN action access to Turkey was lost as a means of transit for our forces into Iraq. U.S. forces were positioned to enter Northern Iraq and engage the opposition north of Baghdad. However, as a result of our delays and an election, the Muslim RPK party gained significant representation and opposed our use of a corridor through Turkey. We were therefore forced to conduct an invasion solely from the South, and our troops billeted in Turkey were required to board ships and travel to Iraq by another route. We never did engage the resistance in the North since our forces stopped at Baghdad. So much for waiting to make another useless trip to the UN.

* What was Secretary Rumsfeld’s position on democratizing and rebuilding Iraq, i.e., nation building, with primarily military forces?

Did Secretary Rumsfeld agree with General Powell’s maxim: if you break it you own it, or did he give other advice to the President? General Powell’s maxim suggests if we remove Saddam then we are responsible for nation building, i.e., putting Iraq’s government and infrastructure back together again. In America Alone, Mark Steyn distinguishes between how we have handled “undesirable” leaders in certain countries in the past by removing them versus the British approach in India, which was to stay for as long as it took to create a country that adhered to British law. Since there were Pentagon efforts to create an out-of-country Iraqi force under Ahmad Chalabi so as to put an Iraqi face and group in charge immediately after the fall of Saddam, the Pentagon apparently did not support a nation building strategy. Unfortunately perhaps, (our known unknown), the State Department prevailed and “the postwar plan failed to provide for the Iraqis themselves to take control as soon as possible.”

Comments By Speaker Pelosi: November 29, 2006

Question to our Speaker: President Bush made the following statement while he was in Estonia en route to Jordan to meet with Prime Minister Maliki about the situation in Iraq:

There's a lot of sectarian violence taking place, fomented in my opinion because of these attacks by al Qaeda, causing people to seek reprisal. And we will work with the Maliki government to defeat these elements.

Response by Ms. Pelosi: When asked for her thoughts about the President’s overseas comment Ms. Pelosi responded that: "The 9/11 Commission dismissed that notion a long time ago and I feel sad that the President is resorting to it again." (Emphasis added)

Comment: Speaker Pelosi didn’t exactly dazzle the Fox All Stars with her blatantly inaccurate response, which they characterized as "confused," "mixed up," "she clearly screwed up here.”

What is sad about “sad” Nancy is that she missed an opportunity to defer comment with a grace note.  All she had to do was say:

While the President is overseas, while he is in route to a meeting with President Maliki, all Democrats wish him the best of success and I prefer to wait until he returns from his trip before commenting on any of his remarks.

It was an opportunity for a simple turning away of a question with grace.  Not only did Ms. Pelosi fail to demonstrate an instance of grace, but also she raised further questions about her judgment and ability. “To every thing there is a season, … a time to keep silence, and a time to speak….”  If Ms. Pelosi had considered this she might have avoided embarrassing herself.

For an earlier Pelosi profundity blog go here.

"Audacity, always audacity, still more audacity."
General George Patton

What would General Patton advise President Bush to do with the much anticipated James Baker, Iraq Study Group (ISG) recommendation to talk with Iran and Syria about achieving stability in Iraq? Patton would likely point to the military campaigns in Afghanistan, where the Taliban were promptly driven out of the country, and in Iraq were Saddam was quickly forced to flee Baghdad. He might say: using U.S. Special Forces with cell phones on camels to help the Afghan rebels defeat the Taliban was “audacious,” and General Tommy Frank’s battle plan racing to Baghdad to remove Saddam was “more audacious.” Rather than talking to Syria, who is sedulously training assassins to kill leaders in Lebanon, and Iran, who is assiduously training Shia militia in Iraq, you need: "Still More Audacity."

As we sputter, spin, and smartly move in place while James Baker and the Iraq Study Group finish their report, commentators fear that James Baker will lead us to regional talks with Syria and Iran where we abandon our Iraqi allies to the wolves in the region.

• Rich Lowry in, Bush adrift, talks about the President’s inability to seize upon a course of action, his delegation of authority to the Generals, and his failure to take responsibility as Lincoln did to master the details of war.

• Frank Gaffney in, The new groupthink, fears that “the Baker-promoted regional strategy is a euphemism for throwing Free Iraq to the wolves in its neighborhood: Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia.”

• And finally, Chester in his blog, “Magical Realism Visits the Middle East, sees similarities in the pending Iraq “solution” to the surreal narratives penned by Garcia-Marquez in his novels. Chester states that the idea that Syria and Iraq will help us stabilize the region that they are responsible for destabilizing is our own current form of “magical realism.”

There is cause for concern if these commentators are correct. Are we about to embark on a course eerily familiar to Prime Minister Chamberlain’s decision appeasing Hitler with the Munich Agreement?

In an editorial: “Neocons' abandon Iraq war at White House front door,” USA Today blames any failure in Iraq on the “neocons.” Some of the neocon failures were the result of: 

· Disbanding the Iraqi army,

· The decision to go war itself, a naive and arrogant exercise in wishful thinking that the nation can't afford to repeat,

· Using weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for an imminent threat to U.S. security,

· Not planning and waging the war properly by implementing the Powell Doctrine and listening to Secretary Powell. Unfortunately, in Iraq, the Powell Doctrine took a back seat to neoconservative fantasies.

First, regarding the alleged disbanding of the Iraqi Army as a mistake: L. Paul Bremmer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, calls this argument a myth that refuses to die since the Iraqi army disintegrated during our invasion. There was never any army to disband and significant concerns were raised by the Shia and other groups about the risks of trying to recreate Saddam’s Sunni senior officer corps. In fact, Mr. Bremmer states this was one decision “we got right.”

Second, the mistake was going to war at all and especially on a pretext of weapons of mass destruction. The Bush Administration, however, prior to Secretary Powell’s appearance at the UN, consistently argued multiple rationales for action against Saddam including his frequent contacts with terrorists; violations of terms agreed to at the end of Gulf War I; daily firing on military aircraft operating in “No Fly Zones,” and human rights abuses.  Media and critics discarded all the other valid rationales for action only after the UN appearance.  

Since then all criticism about Iraq has been reduced to the formula no WMD equals a mistake although other rationales were persuasive.  Senator Lieberman, for example, suggested that the violations of the agreement ending Gulf War I were a sufficient rationale for action.  Failure to take action was a lesson learned from World War II after the Allies delayed acting against Hitler in the early 1930s when he violated Treaty Terms ending World War I.  Another example, Prime Minister Blair based his support on removing Saddam on humanitarian grounds and human rights abuses similar to our rationale for action in Kosovo. Consider that Saddam is currently on trial for atrocities against the Kurds for abuses during less than a twelve-month period which resulted in over 150,000 Kurdish dead.  Even at this past month’s death rate of 3,000 Iraqis, it would take over 4 years to match the devastation Saddam inflicted on the Kurds in just ten months.

Furthermore, the problem was that Iraq was not a transparent country; the absence of WMD places the focus in the wrong place. Saddam created the lack of transparency when he ejected or hid material from the weapons inspectors? Vice President Cheney was correct when he argued under these circumstances the burden of proof is on Saddam to allay the concerns of the world community.

Finally, there is the repeated assertion that the big mistake was going “too light” and not listening to military army officers such as Colin Powell about the need for a larger force. If Secretary Powell was right about the size of the force required, then what to make of the recent testimony that a large force and footprint fails to shift the burden to Iraqis to take responsibility? Also, in Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesman, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot Cohen states that one of the lessons from Vietnam was the size of our force was so large that the burden never shifted to the ARVN forces (Republic of Vietnam) to clean up the corruption and build a viable military force.

Additionally, assuming General Powell was right about the size of the force required, what about his other advice: if you break it you own it; his opposition to Pentagon efforts to create an out-of-country Iraqi force under Ahmad Chalabi so as to put an Iraqi face and group in charge immediately after the fall of Saddam; and seeking UN approval. This “other advice” raises numerous “known unknowns” and makes it exceedingly difficult and incredibly facile to place the blame at the “neocons” doorstep for all conceived errors on Iraq.

First, General Powell repeatedly asserted if you break it you own. Of course, that suggests if we remove Saddam then we are responsible for Iraq. However, in America Alone, Mark Steyn, points to the difference between how we have handled “undesirable” leaders in Mexico in the past by removing them versus the British approach in India which was to stay for as long as it took to create a country that adhered to British law. The Pentagon (and neocons) planned to assist Chalabi and his group of ex-patriots to seize control in Iraq. Arguably, this was not a nation building strategy and approximates a “Mexico approach” (to use Mark Steyn’s formulation) rather than a British approach as in India. Unfortunately perhaps, (our known unknown), the State Department prevailed and “the postwar plan failed to provide for the Iraqis themselves to take control as soon as possible.” Was the L. Paul Bremmer time the best method of transition or did it ensure we would be forced to do a British version of India?

And what about the wisdom of General Powell’s advice to seek another UN resolution on Iraq, despite the fact that there were more than a dozen violations? In the end, the French and Russians never lived up to any commitments they made with the last approved resolution and the time lost resulted in multiple issues that raise further known unknowns. For example, Oriana Fallaci has argued that a mistake in dealing with Iraq was the significant delay after 9/11. She argued that world opinion supported U.S. action after 9/11 and the sooner we acted against Saddam the more world support we would have. Perhaps, the even more significant “error” in pursuing further UN action was the loss of Turkey as a means of transit for our forces into Iraq. U.S. forces were positioned to enter Northern Iraq and engage the opposition north of Baghdad. However, as a result of our delays and an election, the RPK party gained significant representation and opposed our use of a corridor through Turkey. We were therefore forced to conduct an invasion solely from the South and our troops billeted in Turkey were required to board ships and travel to Iraq by another route. We never did engage the resistance in the North since our forces stopped at Baghdad. So much for waiting to make another useless trip to the UN.

Finally, much is made by USA Today and others about our purported failure to heed the lessons of Vietnam – the size of force and the folly of fighting a foreign war. Winston Churchill said the tragedy of World War I was that its lessons were thrown away when Europe refused to respond to Hitler’s aggression. Change in Iraq was inevitable. Consider the “unknown unknowns” involved in all the criticism of the President’s decision to remove Saddam from Iraq. What would an Iraq look like today with Saddam still in charge? What would he be doing with his push to create WMD, his contacts with terrorists, and his plans to create a caliphate? Vietnam is the wrong model. The real tragedy of Iraq would be to forget the lessons of World War II.

Winston Churchill said the tragedy of World War I was that its lessons were thrown away when Europe refused to respond to Hitler’s aggression.  Today, in “Kick him out,” Elie Wiesel argues that in light of the frequent comments by the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to wipe Israel from the map we should take him at his word and not forget the lessons of World War II.  He argues that it is time for the United Nations to expel Iran from the world body. On what grounds would Iran be expelled?  He answers the question:

“It is quite simple: One member state of the United Nations that threatens to destroy another member state of these same United Nations violates its very charter and conventions.”

While he admits it is unlikely that any member state will offer such a resolution, isn’t it time to demand that the U.S. Congress repudiates this conduct?

Why hasn’t their been a move to isolate Iran further with a resolution of Congress condemning this outright attack on a member state?

Furthermore, even if expulsion is untenable, why should a member state that is unwilling or refuses to repudiate such comments be permitted to vote? When will Ambassador Bolton tender such a Resolution?

G.K. Chesterton said: “Men can always be blind to a thing, as long as it is big enough.” A holocaust is no longer unthinkable. It is no longer “big enough” that we can allow ourselves to be blind to it. Time is of the essence. Where is the sense of urgency and importance in Washington?

In "The ‘Eurabia’ Myth,” Ralph Peters responds to commentators such as Mark Steyn, America Alone, and Oriana Fallaci, The Force of Reason, who see a declining Europe ready to be dominated by its’ Muslim immigrants.  Mr. Peters’ message for us is to forget the ‘pop prophets.’  Mr. Peters rejects the idea that Europeans will allow the Muslim immigrants to take over their societies.  He sees a postmodern Europe enjoying the glories of a Kantian “state of universal peace" that is about to return to the Hobbesian realities of its history -- “we’re going to see Europe’s history reprised on meth.”  Rather than a failure of will to respond to the unassimilated Muslim immigrants, continental Europe will return to its history of ethnic cleansing, holocaust, and ejecting the “undesirables” (just as they did the Jews, Huguenots, and Moors in the past).  He concludes with a somber comment: “When Europeans feel sufficiently provoked and threatened - a few serious terrorist attacks could do it - Europe's Muslims will be lucky just to be deported.”

"Courage is almost a contradiction in terms. It means a strong desire to live taking the form of a readiness to die." (From Orthodoxy; quoted in Chesterton Society)

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